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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the 
annual Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research 
projects funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School 
of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote 
speakers, plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show 
and social events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid 
environment where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry 
officials, accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate 
on finding applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and 
processes within the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of 
industry and academia, the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and 
collaborations which can identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, 
contract, financial, logistics and program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, 
electronic copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, 
please visit our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
Symposium during the third week of May, please visit our conference website at: 
www.researchsymposium.org  
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Abstract 
One of the foundations of military command and control is that authority must match 
responsibility.  Yet in weapon system acquisition, a program manager is responsible to 
deliver capabilities to the warfighter without full control of the resources he needs to carry 
out this task.  Successful program managers recognize their dependencies upon other 
actors and execute their programs using a network with a common goal of enhancing a 
specific warfighting capability.  A hierarchical chain of command still exists, but the network 
enables the actors to carry out their objectives in an efficient and effective manner.  This 
report describes how the acquisition process purportedly works in hierarchical terms.  It also 
introduces a process model to describe the set of activities actually used and the actors who 
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are required to collaborate to deliver capabilities to the warfighter.  The analysis of those 
activities between actors reveals that weapon system acquisition behaves like a network.  
Describing acquisition in network terms allows those involved in weapon system acquisition 
oversight, policy, and practice to have new insights and measurement tools to understand 




Over one-hundred years ago, the Wright Brothers were the first to accomplish a 
manned, controlled, heavier-than-air-flight, making history at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, on 
December 17, 1903.  How did two bicycle mechanics from Dayton, Ohio, accomplish this 
feat against a host of inventors?  And, why did the Wright's lose their advantage and not 
continue to make aviation history?  The answer to both questions revolves around their 
networks.  Early on, the Wright's were not only inventors, they were networked innovators.  
Shulman concluded that their early success was due to their correspondence and sharing of 
ideas with Samuel Langley and flight historian Octave Chanute, who had built an extensive 
network within the aviation community (2002).  Following their successful flight, however, the 
Wright's network was limited through secrecy that was driven by a desire to patent the 
airplane and secure a monopoly, even Chanute's request for information about their maiden 
flights (Shulman, 2002).  The Wrights cut themselves off from their network, preferring to 
secure the patents rather than build upon their technological feat.  The loss of their network 
also led to stagnation in their innovation efforts.  Glenn Curtiss, on the other hand, was 
anything but secretive.  He and the Aerial Experiment Association built his June Bug aircraft 
and demonstrated flying to the public.  Eventually, Curtiss' collaborative network yielded the 
invention of 500 aviation devices, many of which are still in use today.  His factory invented 
and sold the flying boat to the Navy, along with 6,000 JN-1 Jenny's, making Curtiss Aircraft 
one of the largest aircraft companies in the world (Shulman, 2002).  In essence, the duel 
between the Wrights and Curtiss proved that the success of complex projects is predicated 
upon the structure of the project's network of collaborators. 
Would Curtiss recognize today's billion-dollar weapon system programs with their 
high-stakes decision-making process ensuring that entrepreneurs do not waste precious 
taxpayer resources?  Or, has the world not changed that much… Do successful programs 
still collaborate and network to successfully deliver capabilities to warfighters? 
Acquisition Process Problems 
Department of Defense (DoD) weapon system acquisition programs are plagued with 
performance shortfalls, and even more notably, cost and schedule overruns.  Addressing 
this problem has spawned numerous studies and reforms over many years.  Most recently, 
the push to reinvent government in the 1990s resulted in a series of reforms that led 
acquisition toward a market-based model.  Despite these efforts to improve efficiency, 
success has yet to be realized, with several recent studies noting increasing cost and 
schedule overruns.  Civilian and military officials at the highest levels in the Pentagon have 
expressed frustration at the lack of balance among the competing interests of cost, 
schedule, and performance in weapon system acquisition programs.  Given many 
stakeholders with multiple interests in the acquisition process and the inability of high-
ranking officials to achieve a balance among competing interests, assigning a program 
manager responsibility for balancing cost, schedule, and performance appears to be a 
nearly impossible task. 
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In addition to problems managing costs, schedule, and performance, warfighters are 
asking even more from their weapon systems, requiring capabilities that are joint, 
interoperable, and able to seamlessly share information.  Joint staffs are looking to gain an 
advantage on the battlefield based upon a revolution in military affairs driven by the 
explosion in information technology.  A weapon system program manager must manage not 
only her own baseline but, in addition, rely on capabilities from other systems that are also in 
development. 
Alternative Acquisition Organizations 
Along with many initiatives to solve the fundamental acquisition problem, the 
strategic assumptions underlying acquisition reforms point to three alternative organizations: 
hierarchical control, market solutions, or network collaboration.  Powell (1990) concluded 
that hierarchies, markets, and networks are the three basic forms of organization.  
Congressional and politically appointed civilian control of the weapon system acquisition 
process, along with the chain of command within the DoD, makes one think of acquisition in 
hierarchical terms.  Alternatively, weapon system acquisition relies heavily on contractors 
who possess the know-how and resources to produce major weapon systems.  A market-
based solution to acquisition problems is also rational.  Finally, acquisition programs create 
the need to cross organizational boundaries for decision-making—necessitating the need for 
a network form of governance. 
The policy-makers and practitioners within the weapon system acquisition process 
do not typically think of the process in network terms.  Yet, Powell (1990) concluded that 
networks are the predominant form of organization with a very few pure markets or 
hierarchies in existence.  This project is devoted to describing the acquisition process in 
network terms.  Therefore, the research question for this paper is:  Does the DoD weapon 
system acquisition process behave as a network? 
The focus of this project is to understand how weapon system acquisition programs 
accomplish their objectives, and whether those interactions fit within the description of a 
network.  This analysis will offer a new perspective on the acquisition process. 
Methodology 
Chapter II describes the acquisition process and its interactions with both the 
warfighters who describe weapon system capability needs and the budget staff who balance 
alternative needs against fiscal constraints.  A process model will be introduced to describe 
the full set of activities and interactions a program must go through from concept to delivery 
and operation. 
With the activities of the acquisition process in mind, Chapter III highlights the 
characteristics of networks.  A definition of networks is established, and aspects of networks 
are described from a review of literature.  Several network analysis techniques are coupled 
with a description of operating within networks, allowing an analysis of the acquisition 
process in network terms in Chapter IV. 
Finally, Chapter V offers conclusions to the basic research question of whether 
weapon system acquisition may be described in network terms.  Further, several 
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Weapon System Acquisition Process 
The Department of Defense (DoD) weapon system acquisition process must be 
described before it can be characterized as a hierarchy, network, or market.  This Chapter 
will describe the acquisition process and its interactions with other key processes.  To 
analyze these interactions, a detailed process model will be introduced that describes the 
activities and actors involved in transforming inputs into outputs in the form of knowledge 
and, ultimately, weapon systems. 
Background 
The mission of defense acquisition is to deliver needed capabilities to warfighters.  In 
the hands of warfighters, these capabilities are able to produce constructive effects on the 
battlefield.  The defense acquisition system is, in essence, developing the set of equipment 
that will be used to fight the next war.  The process of collaboration among competing 
agencies to make these decisions is a very complex task that combines optimization of 
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities 
(DOTMLPF) solutions within the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System 
(JCIDS).  Additionally, these decisions are dynamic, changing over time in response to 
environmental variables.  This results in changing desires and continuing debate over what 
is the best solution.   
Further, delivering materiel capability requires a complex set of actors, and even 
more stakeholders, who, from markedly different perspectives, seek to optimize the various 
processes of technology development, integration, test and evaluation, production, fielding, 
and sustainment of weapon systems.  Nevertheless, the governing directive within the DoD, 
Directive 5000.1, gives the Program Manager the purported authority and the clear 
responsibility to deliver required capabilities to the warfighter (Department of Defense, 
2003a).  Therefore, the Program Manager must find ways to shape the capability needs 
from the JCIDS requirements generation system; choose a design architecture, mature 
technologies, and develop an acquisition strategy within the Defense Acquisition System; 
and seek resources from the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
System.  Dynamic interaction among these systems is required to deliver a capability to the 
warfighter.  Kadish, et al., described this interaction as the "Big A" acquisition process 
(2006).  This paper will use this cross-cutting definition of the acquisition process.  
This chapter will highlight the key processes and interactions required to deliver a 
capability.  The JCIDS, Defense Acquisition System, and PPBE system will be briefly 
examined.  A process model will be introduced to highlight the depth and complexity of the 
interactions the acquisition process must perform to deliver a capability. 
 Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was born out of 
the perception that each service parochially examined alternatives within its own core 
competencies, rather than from the perspective of a joint warfighting environment.  The 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 created a framework where Combatant Commanders 
(COCOMs) are responsible for joint operations, and service secretaries and commanders 
are responsible to organize, train, and equip the military to conduct army, naval, and air 
operations in support of the combatant commanders (Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986).  The 
Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the COCOMs a significant voice in the funding process.  JCIDS 
essentially took the next step and institutionalized a process in which requirements are 
jointly conceived, validated, and approved prior to each service implementing those needs. 
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The other effect of JCIDS is to define capabilities gaps rather than threat-driven 
needs.  The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01 E defined 
capabilities as: 
The ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and 
conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of 
tasks. It is defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational 
terms in the format of a joint or initial capabilities document or a joint doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 
facilities (DOTMLPF) change recommendation (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 2005).  
 JCIDS Pattern of Relationships 
The drivers of the JCIDS process are the representatives of the warfighting 
community.  The Combatant Commands and Joint Staff run key portions of the process.  
The services’ requirements communities become involved as they sponsor an approach that 
falls inside one of their warfighting core competencies.  One difficulty in the JCIDS process 
is getting the services involved without corrupting the process by making it a forum for the 
each service to argue for its preferred approach.  JCIDS is supposed to avoid this problem 
through Joint Staff analysis of capability gaps identified by the Combatant Commands. 
Several presentations at the PEO/SYSCOM Conference in December 2003 outlined 
what are essentially opposing views on the service's role during a panel on aligning JCIDS 
and the Defense Acquisition System.  Dr Glenn Lamartin, OSD(AT&L) Director of Defense 
Systems noted throughout his briefing that the new JCIDS and Acquisition policies had to be 
followed with collaborative relationships between the OSD, the Functional Capabilities 
Boards, and the Services to support decision-making (2003).  Dr. Nancy Spruill, OSD(AT&L) 
Director of Acquisition Resources and Analysis, supported a view that the OSD ought to be 
the decision-maker in the process, holding cross-cutting Defense Acquisition Boards and 
either cutting or accelerating service programs to meet joint needs (2003).  Essentially, Dr 
Spruill viewed the services as materiel providers who would react to OSD-defined solutions, 
whereas Dr Lamartin valued the services’ inputs to the joint architectures and decisions as a 
critical interdependency.  The right viewpoint is the one that recognizes how information is 
distributed.  If information that is needed for decision-making is distributed within the 
services and the combatant commands, the services ought to be involved.  If the Combatant 
Commands and Joint Staff have the information they need to derive alternatives that 
integrate with current warfighting systems and doctrine, then the services might be viewed 
as implementers of systems. 
 JCIDS Realities 
As structured as the JCIDS process appears, the reality is that requirements change 
over time.  As technological possibilities and threat conditions change, so do needs of the 
warfighter.  Within the acquisition system, "requirements creep" may show up late in the 
process in the form of expectations or actual changes to written requirements.  JCIDS 
institutionalized this concept with the Capabilities Production Document, offering the 
opportunity for requirements changes before entering low-rate initial production (Matthews, 
2004).  Further, the expectations of the warfighter are often not met in a timely manner 
because expectations evolve over time.  Without changing written requirements, the 
operational community may interpret what was previously stated in a requirements 
document differently.  Therefore, both the perception and the reality is that the desired 
outputs of the acquisition system are dynamic. 
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 Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System 
The funding for the program comes through the PPBE process.  Every other year, 
the OSD issues budget guidance, and the services begin a biannual cycle of preparing 
program objective memorandums (POM) to advocate their program's needs among other 
service priorities.  Eventually, the OSD comptroller and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) prepare the defense portion of the President's Budget.  Even though 
Congress normally appropriates money for only each fiscal year, the POM for a program 
portrays the budget reflected in the Future Year Defense Program.  This, in essence, gives 
the budget community a forecast of what the budget will look like to satisfy spending 
priorities for the next several fiscal years. 
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system is a centralized, 
structured way of allocating resources to support the National Security Strategy.  McCaffrey 
and Jones described the goal of PPBE as balancing forces, equipment, and support given 
resource constraints (2004).  Given the competitive nature of the services, this process 
allows the Secretary of Defense to balance competing objectives and select the most 
beneficial use of resources.  
The overlap of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution phases, along 
with the multitude of disparate stakeholders, makes the system very complex.  Nonetheless, 
there is structure from the strategies of the planning phase, to the alternatives of the 
programming phase, the constraining of the budgeting phase, and finally, the execution 
phase where funds are appropriated, allocated, re-allocated, and expended.  Lewis, Brown, 
and Roll contend that the Air Force budget process includes centralized planning and 
decentralized execution with the Major Commands (MAJCOMs) playing a key role as the 
interface with the COCOMs.  The JCIDS process generates capability needs that flow 
through Air Staff to OSD to become part of the budget.  Budget and manpower flow through 
Air Staff to the program office for execution (2002). 
 Defense Acquisition System 
The Defense Acquisition System refines concepts; matures technologies; develops 
and integrates system designs; and tests, produces, sustains, and disposes of weapon 
systems in response to warfighter needs.  The Department of Defense Directive (DODD 
5000.1) (Department of Defense, 2003a, sec. 3.2) governing weapon system acquisition 
defines an acquisition program as:  "a directed, funded effort that provides a new, improved, 
or continuing materiel, weapon or information system or service capability in response to an 
approved need." 
The sponsor (i.e., a Major Command in the Air Force) uses the JCIDS process as 
outlined above to define the need.  The interface with the acquisition community is through 
the Initial Capabilities Document.  This input is refined in the concept-refinement phase 
through the Analysis of Alternatives process to select a materiel alternative that is 
operationally and cost-effective.  The sponsor is responsible for the analysis of alternatives 
using a collaborative process with the acquirer, developer, tester, and other enabling 
communities to refine the "art of the possible" (Air Force, 2005, p. 9). 
The acquisition process uses a high-level framework as shown in Figure 1 that 
serves as a common reference and set of expectations for all programs.  The reality is that 
every program is unique.  An infamous retort within the acquisition community when asked a 
general question about acquisition programs is, "It depends."  The expectations for each 
program are established through the milestone decision authority at a milestone decision. 
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Figure 1. Acquisition Phases and Milestones  
(Department of Defense, 2003b) 
 
 
Despite many interdependencies across the acquisition stakeholder community, DoD 
Directive 5000.1 names the milestone decision authority and program manager as key 
participants.  The milestone decision authority is given overall responsibility for the program, 
while the program manager is, "the designated individual with the responsibility for and 
authority to meet program objectives" (2003a). The reality, however, is that the program 
manager must collaborate among many interests to accomplish program objectives.  
Collaboration using integrated product teams (IPT) is the tool designated to resolve 
competing interests.  The collaborative process is not specified in detail, although DoD 
Directive 5000.1 (2003a) lists the communities that ought to participate in collaborative 
decision-making and identifies the IPT as the entry point for organizations that want to 
collaborate.  The program manager and milestone decision authority use the IPTs' advice to 
make better decisions (Department of Defense, 2003a). 
Weapon system acquisition process model 
 Purpose 
Given a plethora of the stakeholders and a complex product-development process, 
the set of interactions required to manage a program need to be well understood.  
Describing the process to manage an acquisition program helps assess who interacts and 
how they interact to accomplish a program.  The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
(Acquisition Integration), SAF/AQX, formed the Acquisition Process Action Team (APAT) in 
Spring 2005 to describe the set of processes Air Force weapon systems were using to 
accomplish their missions.  The goals were to baseline the acquisition processes and form a 
common language and basis of measurement across the stakeholders in the acquisition 
process.  The group focused mainly on the defense acquisition system itself and its 
interactions with JCIDS and PPBE. 
Lt. Col. Michael Paul and Major Ryan Mantz, SAF/AQXA, led the APAT effort.  A 
group of consultants from the Center for Reengineering and Enabling Technologies (CRET) 
provided the methodology and manpower to support the data-gathering effort.  Mr. Mike 
Wilhelm, CRET, was instrumental in managing the effort. 
In order to assess the interactions within weapon system acquisition, the APAT used 
an enterprise process-model approach.  A process model offers a look across the many 
disciplines within weapon system acquisition to understand what behaviors the team is 
using to solve the problem.  The model is put into process terms, where each step is defined 
as a verb-subject relationship.  Instead of describing a contracting/source selection process, 
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the step is simply "Select Source."  This allows the team to focus on the stakeholders' inputs 
to the process instead of driving the description solely in contracting terms. 
Another important aspect of a process model is to describe the relationship between 
the steps and other actors.  In essence, the process model is a look at the 
interdependencies within the acquisition system.  Each step in the process is described in 
terms of inputs, outputs, triggers, and mechanisms.  A source of those characteristics is also 
described.  This allows the model to describe interaction with other steps in the process. 
 Data Gathering 
The APAT team used the DOD 5000 series regulations as a jumping-off point.  The 
major steps in the process were chosen as the high-level steps in the process.  This allowed 
the model to refer back to a reference to which acquisition, logistics, finance, contracting, 
test, and requirements personnel could relate.  Beginning with the high-level process, the 
APAT team held several workshops with a core group to decompose the high-level process 
into a series of lower-level process steps.  To ensure that the process model reflected the 
interactions across the Air Force acquisition process, the team established a series of 
workshops with acquisition personnel to refine the second-level of the model and develop 
the third and lower-levels of the model.  Each workshop lasted approximately two days and 
was focused on a particular phase of the acquisition process.  Participants from all bases 
were invited, but the main, working-level participants were from the host base.  A series of 
workshops were held at the Pentagon, Eglin AFB, Warner-Robins AFB, and Wright-
Patterson AFB, which gathered 120 collective participants from across acquisition functions 
of requirements, engineering, test, program management, finance, sustainment, 
maintenance, and disposal.  Further, telephone conferences were held to refine the results. 
 Results 
The team used the following definitions as part of the process-decomposition 
effort: 
Process Logical set of steps transforming an input into an output 
Inputs Information or resource consumed in the activity to create the output 
Outputs Information produced by an activity 
Suppliers Those who provide the input to the process 
Customers Those who receive the output of the process 
Key Players Those ultimately responsible for the process being accomplished 
Controls Business rules that govern the performance of an activity 
Mechanisms Resource that performs or supports an activity, but is not consumed 
by the activity 
Processes were decomposed into roughly five to seven sub-processes that were the 
key components of the higher-level process.  The workshop participants were instructed to 
keep decomposing processes until they were defined at an "actionable level."  In reality, the 
processes were decomposed until workshop participants could not agree on sub-processes 
that generally fit most programs. 
Appendix A depicts the output from the APAT effort.  The APAT effort identified 27 
process steps supporting the five major DoD 5000 acquisition phases. Beneath the major 
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processes are 107 sub-processes with 172 supporting activities.  The workshop participants 
were more comfortable with the latter three phases of the acquisition process than the first 
two.  Concept Refinement and Technology Development had fewer sub-process and 
supporting activity steps upon which participants were able to agree. 
Even more important than the numbers of steps are the key players, suppliers, and 
customers of each process step.  To make the data more manageable for this paper, key 
sub- processes and supporting activities were chosen in the Concept-refinement, 
Technology-development, and System-design and Development phases of the acquisition 
process.  These phases shape the program and lock-in the design characteristics that affect 
cost schedule and performance during the latter phases.  Therefore, this paper focuses on 
these early phases of acquisition. 
What is a Network? 
 Introduction 
Chapter II defines both how weapon system acquisition purportedly and actually 
behaves.  There is a defined, hierarchical chain of command with a milestone decision 
authority and a program manager who is responsible for delivering a weapon system 
capability.  The APAT process study also revealed that the inputs required to deliver this 
capability require a set of stakeholder interactions that go outside the boundaries of the 
traditional chain of command.  Further, the stakeholders involved have differing and 
dynamic objectives causing both real and perceived instability within the acquisition process.  
First, however, to address the question of whether the defense acquisition system can be 
characterized as a network, one must first define networks and understand their basic 
properties.   
 Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks 
The specialized support required for a project often conjures up images of 
hierarchical organizations that integrate these specialties together for a common purpose.  
Alternatively, a project might be accomplished through the marketplace where products and 
services are efficiently offered to those who have the highest willingness to pay.  Ronald 
Coase’s early work on transaction costs compared firms and markets as alternatives to one 
another.  According to Coase, firms resorted to hierarchy when it was less costly compared 
establishing and monitoring individual contracts in a market.  The growth of the firm was 
balanced with the increasing expenses to organize a larger labor force due to diminishing 
marginal returns.  Eventually, the cost of an additional transaction within the firm was equal 
to the cost of contracting in the marketplace for the same goods or services (Coase, 1937). 
Powell introduced the concept that a network existed between a self-forming 
marketplace and a hierarchical organization.  He rejected the view that networks are neither 
part of a market-to-hierarchy continuum, nor do they represent a hybrid form of hierarchy.  
As evidence, Powell offered two examples that pointed to the existence of networks.  He 
noted the blurring of the boundaries between markets and inter-organizational 
collaborations, such as cooperative joint ventures.  His second example was the creation of 
enduring relationships between hierarchies and their consulting, law, and banking firms—
indicating that a network form of governance existed between these organizations (1990). 
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Defining Networks 
 Why Network? 
Before delving into the definitions of a network, it is worth noting the inherent 
strengths and weaknesses of each form of organization.  Markets are ideal for simple 
transactions in which inputs and outputs are measurable and are not based on a number of 
contingencies.  Coase (1937, p. 287) described the marketplace as: "under no central 
control […] supply is adjusted to demand, and production to consumption."   
Hierarchies evolved to control the specialized inputs needed to produce complex 
products or services for which the inputs may not be available in the commercial 
marketplace.  Coase (1937) used the classic example of specialized labor where a firm 
chose to employ an individual with specific skills, thereby internalizing the uncertainties 
associated with inputs.  Additionally, the firm would also observe that person’s work on the 
job and make adjustments (Williamson, 1973).  Therefore, hierarchies excel when inputs 
have uncertainty, since they allow internal observation and adjustment during the course of 
business. 
Networks are adept at handling uncertainty associated with both inputs and outputs.  
O'Toole (1997) described uncertainty as leading to wicked problems that cannot be divided 
into tasks that are isolated from each other.  Powell agreed that networks form as 
organizations choose to pool resources to manage uncertainties, thereby creating 
interdependencies from which a firm cannot easily walk away.  He elaborated that networks 
are particularly adept at exchanging resources that are difficult to measure, such as "know-
how, technological capability, a particular approach or style of production" (1990, p. 304). 
 Network Definition 
While a network is fairly well understood in today’s society, such familiarity with 
networks may lead to a variety of definitions.  The most straight forward definition of a 
network comes from sociology.  Borgatti and Foster (2003, p. 992) described this type of 
governance this way: “A network is a set of actors connected by a set of ties.”  Marsden and 
Lin (1982) and Knoke and Kuklinski (1991) emphasized persistent relationships among 
actors, focusing on their relationships rather than the actors themselves or the groups to 
which they belong.  Whereas an actor continues to exist apart from the network, a network 
does not exist without the relationship between the actors. 
Another example of networks comes from the field of public administration where 
networks are used among government, non-government, and private agencies.  Kickert, 
Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997, p. 6) described networks as “stable patterns of social relations 
between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy 
programmes.”  This definition is broad, spanning coalitions of intergovernmental and non-
governmental actors organized around both issues and delivery of public goods and 
services.   
This report will utilize the Kickert, et al. (1997) definition of networks in which actors 
are dependent upon one another; there are lasting, stable relationships; and the network is 
formed around a policy or project.  In comparing this definition with others, Klijn (1997) 
identified three characteristics of networks: 
 Networks form due to interdependencies between actors. 
 Networks consist of multiple actors who have their own objectives. 
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 Networks consist of the lasting relationships between the various actors. 
The first condition for a network is interdependencies.  Klijn (1997) suggested 
resource dependency is a key driver of lasting relationships since organizations require 
exchange of capital, personnel, and knowledge with other organizations.  Powell (1990) and 
Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti (1997) similarly emphasized actors within networks performing 
complex exchanges and transactions using trust and norms rather than market-driven, 
legally enforceable contracts.  
Again, the condition for more than one actor comes into the definition with the added 
criteria that each has his/her own objectives.  Scharpf (1978) concluded that within  
government, there is no single actor and no unifying goal.  Instead, policy was a result of 
interactions among multiple actors in which coordination is achieved through exchanges of 
material, information, and legitimacy. 
The final characteristic of networks is that they are composed of lasting relationships 
among the actors.  Klijn (1997) and Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) concluded that 
relationship patterns in a network are defined according to their frequency over time.  
Repeated interactions strengthen the relationship.  As a pattern of behavior develops during 
on-going interactions, actors will begin to understand who they can trust and who they 
cannot trust.  Therefore, the basis for the network is the willingness to establish 
interdependency based on that frequent, lasting relationship. 
Network Analysis 
 Network Structure 
In analyzing a network, the individuals within the network are not as important as the 
relationships between them.  Since networks imply interactions in which no one individual 
has all the resources to solve a problem, the dyadic relationship is the basic unit of 
structure.  At the next higher level of analysis, the network as a whole will determine the 
success of outcomes.  How the dyadic relationships are arranged to form a network count in 
achieving a result.  Therefore, structure determines how the group as a whole will perform. 
 
Figure 2. Asymmetric Informational Network  
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Table 1.  Matrix Representation of an Asymmetric Network  
(Knoke, 1990, p. 237) 
 
 A B C D E F G H I J Total 
A  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
B 1  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
C 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
D 1 1 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
E 1 0 0 0  1 1 1 0 0 4 
F 0 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 0 1 
G 0 0 0 0 1 0  0 0 0 1 
H 0 0 0 0 1 0 0  0 0 1 
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0  0 1 
J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Total 4 2 2 2 4 1 2 1 0 0 18 
 
To illustrate the concepts of measuring information flow in a network, a hypothetical 
example of a network in which actors exchange information asymmetrically is shown in 
Figure 2.  The arrows depict the flow of information.  An adjacency matrix is used to 
represent this information flow from actors to one another.  The number one in a row 
represents transmitting information from the actor in the row to the actor in the column, 
whereas a zero indicates that no information is transmitted.  The number one in a column 
represents receipt of information, and a zero represents no information receipt.  Knoke 
(1990) developed the above matrix in Table 1, concluding from the totals for the columns 
and rows that A receives the information from more sources, and E transmits information to 
the most actors. 
 Actors’ Positions within the Network 
Switching from the network back to the individual actor as a unit of analysis, the 
above tools also allow an assessment of how the actor fits into the structure of the network.  
Freeman (1977) introduced measures of a node's centrality based on his definition of 
position centrality:  "the degree they stand between others, and can therefore facilitate, 
impede or bias the transmission of messages."  These nodes control the information flow in 
the network more than others.   
Centrality appears to be directly correlated with the efficiency of the network and the 
power of the individual who is more central.  Freeman (1977) applied centrality measures to 
other studies of communication in small group settings, and concluded that centrality was 
related to solving problems with speed, efficiency and personal satisfaction.  Likewise, 
Krackhardt's (1990) work correlated Freeman's measures of centrality to perceived power in 
a small, entrepreneurial organization. 
 Relating Network Structure to Network Effectiveness 
From the perspective of the network as a whole, a definition of network effectiveness 
must be defined on multiple levels across multiple agencies.  Provan and Milward (2001) 
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offer the community, or area the network serves, the network itself, and the organization and 
participants as the levels among which a network should be evaluated to satisfy multiple 
stakeholder perspectives.  Their empirical study developed the following conclusions: 
 Networks are more effective when they are integrated through centralization, 
although networks that are integrated through a core agency and integrated through 
dense links among members will be less effective than those are integrated through 
a core agency alone. 
 Networks are most effective when external controls are directly applied, rather than 
applied through an agency. 
 Networks are most effective when a degree of stability is achieved, especially when 
the stability and uncertainty impacts clients. 
 When the above conditions are optimal, resource scarcity will limit the effectiveness 
of the network.  Conversely, resource abundance allows the network to range from 
low to high effectiveness, depending on the conditions above. 
Analysis 
Application of the network Perspective to weapon system 
acquisition 
Chapter II described the acquisition system and its formal hierarchical operating 
structure.  Chapter III introduced the network perspective and its basic assumptions and 
methodology.  This chapter draws on the data from the APAT process model and concludes 
that the acquisition system has network-like properties.  The implications of the acquisition 
system’s network characteristics are explored in terms of acquisition governance.  
 Interdependencies between Actors 
One of the key characteristics of a network is the relationships between the actors.  
Interdependencies between actors are the basis for the formation of networks (Klijn, 1997; 
Powell, 1990; Jones, Hesterly & Borgatti, 1997).  The interdependencies are based on the 
exchange of resources, and develop in situations in which the actors need capital, 
personnel, and knowledge to accomplish their objectives (Klijn, 1997). 
To deliver a weapon system, numerous actors are involved, as shown in the 
relationship matrices in Appendix B.  One of the key interdependencies during the 
acquisition process is the exchange of knowledge between actors.  During the first three 
phases of the acquisition process, knowledge about what you need to buy and how the 
system should be designed to meet that need is the focus of the activities.  As shown in 
Appendix A, Process 1.0, the outputs of the Concept Refinement phase include an 
approved Course of Action, identification of resources needed for the next phase, approved 
milestone decision documents, a signed acquisition-decision memorandum, and a 
technology-development strategy.  All of this knowledge is based on the collaborations 
among the stakeholders during each activity.  
The interdependencies between actors for Concept Refinement are modeled in 
Figure 3.  For modeling purposes, the interactions are assumed to be two-way, directed 
collaborations.  The relationships are those that are specified in the Concept Refinement 
processes or may be inferred from the type of documents that are approved during that 
phase.  For example, approval of a Test Evaluation Master Plan for a large program 
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requires an OSD (DOT&E) signature.  Of course, these are not the only relationships that a 
program might need to carry out the objectives of this phase of the acquisition cycle.  This is 
a minimum set that one would expect to see for any major acquisition program.   
The diagram shown in Figure 3 illustrates the interdependencies required to define 
the weapon system concept, select the course of action, and prepare for the Technology 
Development phase.  As one could guess based on the description of responsibilities in 
JCIDS and the DoD 5000 series regulations, the lead acquisition organization program 
manager (node 4), the MAJCOM requirements organization (node 2), and the milestone 
decision authority (node 5) have critical roles during this phase.  Freeman's measure of 
degree centrality (1977) for those nodes is relatively higher indicating the probability that 
they will control resources in the network. 
Graphically, Figure 3 portrays the collaboration required with the other 22 actors to 
accomplish the outputs of this acquisition phase.  Individually, the lead acquisition 
organization, the MAJCOM requirements organization, and the milestone decision authority 
do not interface with all of the other actors.  The spreadsheet in Appendix B for the Concept 
Refinement interactions denotes the lead acquisition organization collaborating with 18 other 
actors.  Of the seven actors with which the lead acquisition organization does not interface, 
the program manager must rely on other organizations to gather information from those 
parts of the network. 
Figure 3. Concept Refinement Interdependencies 
 
Given a weapon system concept, the purpose of the Technology Development 
phase of the acquisition process is to mature key technologies and to plan for weapon 
system development.  These two activities require a diverse set of interdependencies.  
Maturing technology requires an in-depth understanding of the concept and system 
architecture as well as a diverse network of technology providers.  Furthermore, the program 
must define the capability needs in the Capabilities Development Document (CDD).  Along 
with the capability needs, operational, support, maintenance, and interoperability concepts 
must be refined so the weapon system may be designed with these plans in mind.  The 
acquisition systems engineering, test, logistics, contracting, and financial-management 
communities collaborate with the warfighters to translate concepts into an executable 
acquisition program. 
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To understand these interactions, this analysis focuses on process 2.1.2, Identify 
Technologies for Maturation, process 2.1.3, Define Technology Maturation Plan, and 
process 2.5, Develop and Prepare Documents for Milestone B, which the APAT model 
decomposed as noted in Appendix A.  The diagram of the interdependencies for this phase 
is illustrated in Figure 4, while the matrix-view is in Appendix B. 
The diagram in Figure 4 reveals that there are 28 actors involved in the acquisition 
program, an increase from the Concept-refinement phase.  Based on degree centrality, the 
lead acquisition organization/program manager (node 4) remains the most central actor, 
maintaining many of the relationships from the previous phase.  Likewise, the MAJCOM 
requirements organization (node 2) and the milestone decision authority (node 5) also 
maintain their central role.  A number of other actors at the OSD and service-level become 
more prominent, as demonstrated by their degree centrality.  The network relies on 
relationships with these actors to provide guidance and priorities that shape the program 
from an operational, acquisition strategy, and budget perspective.  Therefore, the influence 
of the key actors is still great, but there are many relationships developing during this phase 
that are beyond the control of the key actors. 
Figure 4. Technology Development Planning/Milestone Interdependencies 
 
During System Development and Demonstration, the critical activities include 
allocating requirements and developing a design, testing the design, and preparing for 
production and fielding of the system.  This analysis focuses on process 3.1, Manage the 
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Figure 5. System Development and Demonstration Interdependencies 
 
The diagram in Figure 5 depicts a less dense, decentralized network.  In terms of 
degree centrality, the program manager (node 4) is still the most central actor, although the 
MAJCOM requirements organization (node 2) is now less central than the contractor (node 
10) in influencing the network.  The rise of the contractor's centrality indicates the 
importance of the contractor’s information to the network in a monopolistic environment.  
This measure of centrality for the sole non-governmental actor is of interest to those who 
want to influence the outcome of the network at the community, network, and organizational 
levels of analysis. 
 Multiple, Independent Actors Formed around a Project 
Another characteristic of a network is that there is more than one actor who shares 
some common attribute that forms the context of their relationship.  Using the types of 
network relationships from Knoke and Kuklinski (1991), the actors involved in concept 
refinement would share several types of relationships.  Since information is a key resource, 
many relationships are communication relations.  Relationships with industry might be 
described in transactional terms, where dollars are expended so resources can be utilized to 
help gather information on different acquisition concepts.  Finally, authority/power relations 
exist among the relationships.  Process 1.1 in Appendix A describes the controls on the 
process from the Congressional, OSD, and service level.  These controls may be targeted 
specifically at a program, such as when Congress earmarks an appropriation for a specific 
program. 
One of the key questions is whether the actors remain independent to pursue their 
own objectives for the project.  As noted above, there are authority/power relations exerted 
on the program.  In fact, the lead acquisition organization program manager works for the 
service acquisition executive, typically through the PEO as an intermediate supervisor.  
Many of the actors, however, do not work for one another.  Congress clearly does not work 
for the program manager, and the converse is also true.  In addition, key collaborators such 
as the MAJCOM and the lead acquisition organization do not work for one another even 
though they are in the same service.  If the lead acquisition organization and the MAJCOM 
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requirements organization had a dispute, they would have to resolve it at the Chief of Staff 
of the Air Force/Secretary of the Air Force level.  Issues are not resolved typically at that 
level.  Instead, the actors utilize their relationship with one another to collaborate and work 
through issues. 
 Lasting, Stable Relationships between Actors  
The final characteristic to be analyzed is the pattern of relationships between actors 
over time.  Again, the literature stresses the importance of this characteristic based on the 
need to strengthen relationships (Klijn, 1997).  In long-term acquisition programs with both 
complexity and uncertainty, this characteristic is important to allow actors to establish trust 
with one another.  This trust enables actors to make transaction-specific investments that 
will further the objectives of both the actors and the network. 
To examine this variable, the set of actors in the first three acquisition phases were 
analyzed to determine if the relationship spanned multiple acquisition phases—which could 
last from a couple of years to over a decade.  The analysis is inexact since only select 
processes from the Technology Development phase and System Development and 
Demonstration phase were analyzed.  Nonetheless, a group of 10 actors form 13 enduring 
relationships that span the formation and development of an acquisition program.  This 
group of key players and their relationships are displayed in Appendix B. 
High-degree centrality among this core group denotes the actors who continually 
control resources over time.  Not surprisingly, the program office has the highest degree 
centrality within this persistent group of core actors.  Interestingly, the MAJCOM budget 
organization and modernization budget integrator on Air Staff, SAF/AQX, also have high-
degree centrality—stemming from their control over the fiscal resources needed to execute 
the acquisition program. 
 Network Governance 
A network view of acquisition allows an analyst to examine outcomes and 
management strategies in a new way.  Rather than focusing on accountability, the focus 
shifts to understanding how to enable the network as a whole to create greater value.  As 
Provan and Milward (2001) suggested, the effectiveness of the network ought to be 
analyzed at the community, network, and participant level.  Understanding the outcomes 
desired from acquisition programs across the Congressional and warfighting community, the 
acquisition community, and the individual organizations within the network allows a holistic 
analysis of how the network ought to be structured to accomplish these desires. 
A review of the data in Appendix B supports the conclusion that the Lead Acquisition 
Organization/Program Manager is the most central actor within the acquisition process in 
terms of degree centrality.  Furthermore, this actor has the greatest range of relationships, 
brokering information from the warfighter, budget community, technology community, and 
contractor.  This places the Program Manager in a very important position in the network. 
Not all program managers perform equally.  Some may be unable to stabilize their  
inherently unstable networks.  Other managers may have perfectly adequate networks, but 
the manager is unable to understand how to manage in a network.   Whatever the case, 
understanding the structure of the network should enable program managers to understand 
the environment within which successful programs are executed. 
Further, an understanding of the network allows an analysis of second-order effects 
due to changes in the network.  Provan and Milward (1995) concluded that resource scarcity 
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would limit the effectiveness of any network.  When resources are adequate, however, 
factors such as centralization, direct external controls, and stability may also affect the 
outcomes of networks.  An understanding of the structure of the acquisition program 
network would allow an analysis of the effects of changes using modeling.  The resultant 
outcomes could be analyzed at the participant, network, and community level.  In other 
words, a network view of acquisition would allow individual participants to understand how 
their outcomes and the network's outcomes would be affected by the continuing change in 
policy, resources, and players in the acquisition system. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions 
 Research Question 
The focus of this paper was to answer the following research question:  does the 
DoD weapon system acquisition process behave as a network? 
The characterization of the "Big A" acquisition system as a complex interaction of the 
JCIDS subsystem, the PPBE subsystem, and the defense acquisition subsystem identified 
multiple stakeholders who value different outcomes.  Each of these players attempts to 
utilize some form of hierarchy to break down tasks and assign responsibility to ensure task 
accomplishment. 
However, the APAT process model revealed a more complex, interactive process 
among the JCIDS, PPBE, and the acquisition subsystems.  Appendix B portrays the key 
players in the first three phases of the acquisition cycle.  An analysis of these players 
reveals that many do not work for one another and may have differing objectives.  
Furthermore, examination of the key activities within the Concept Refinement, Technology 
Development, and System Development and Demonstration phases, and the interactions of 
the key players who were involved in the controls, inputs, activities, and outputs of each 
subsystem, revealed key interdependencies and long, stable relationships among 
independent actors.  This analysis led to the conclusion that weapon system acquisition can 
be conceptualized as a network. 
 Further Refinements 
Analysis of the APAT process model data also led to an understanding that centrality 
is not equally distributed within the network.  The lead acquisition organizations/program 
manager is a central figure who has the greatest number of relationships and is most central 
to the network measured in terms of degree of centrality.  Despite the program manager's 
lack of a high position within a hierarchical model, network analysis reveals that the program 
manager has the greatest number of contacts and interactions within the network. 
Additionally, there is a core group of actors who have a persistent set of relationships 
during the early, critical stages of the acquisition process.  While the program manager is 
well-placed within this core group, there are other important actors who deal with budgets 
and have sustained relationships over time.  Understanding the structure of this group and 
their relationships with the rest of the network will be important in helping the acquisition 
community develop strategies to govern the network and influence changes for improved 
network performance and outcomes.  
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Recommendations 
 Validate the Model 
First, the data gathered in the APAT model were intended to serve as a framework to 
understand the current acquisition process as it applies to a majority of programs.  The 
scope of the data-gathering process limited the ability to focus on all interactions.  
Therefore, activities such as milestone decisions were described as an exercise in 
document writing.  Those involved in the APAT effort recognized that the documents 
generated for a milestone decision were actually the culmination of a set of interactions to 
gather data and develop a strategy for a particular portion of the acquisition program.  For 
this effort, the official who approved the document and the program office WIPT were 
assumed to be the only participants.  This is, in fact, probably not true.  Participants might 
include other organizations, depending on the subject matter of the program and local 
procedures. 
Therefore, the model serves as a good first step to begin to explore certain 
interactions within the acquisition system.  If a certain set of interactions or a set of actors 
are of interest, gathering more detailed data would be valuable to further the understanding 
of the network and to validate the model. 
 Network Framework to Study Improved Outcomes 
The data-gathering effort for the APAT model was not prescriptive.  While the 
sponsors of the effort were interested in recognizing areas for improvement, the model was 
meant to describe the current process.  There are reasons for the patterns of relationships 
established in the model, but there also may be improved ways of interacting. 
Indeed, the network model, once validated, could be utilized as a framework to 
assess program success.  Those who control acquisition policy or who participate in 
acquisition programs likely would be interested in studying how the networks of these 
programs of interest differ from the norm.  DoD Directive 5000.1 gives the program manager 
and milestone decision authority flexibility to decide what the correct set of activities and 
relationships should be for a particular acquisition program.  Studying network models of 
similar programs might enable decision-makers to tailor their efforts and focus resources on 
valuable relationships.  Alternatively, acquisition strategies could be modeled to discover if 
information flows efficiently and effectively given several scenarios for organizing a program. 
 Simulate Changes to the Acquisition System 
Of course, there are number of challenges within the acquisition process.  
Consistently delivering cost, schedule, and performance is rare as Augustine and Fabini 
(1983), Jones (1996), and McNutt (1998) agreed.  Improving consistency of the system has 
spawned a number of changes—some of which are initially declared successful, only to be 
later discredited for their "unintended consequences."  An example is the initiative to give 
the contractor Total System Performance Responsibility.  This initiative gave the contractor 
more flexibility and responsibility for the performance of the acquisition program.  
Unfortunately, the effects of this change were probably not studied using a network analysis.  
The decision-makers acted upon the ideology that the marketplace solved all their problems. 
A number of changes to the acquisition system are being considered today.  JCIDS 
mandates that programs have been have a Net-ready Key Performance Parameter 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).  This attempt to build a communication system 
  
                  Acquisition Research: CREATING SYNERGY FOR INFORMED CHANGE      - 228 - 
 
by mandating interoperability from those who will utilize the system is much like the chicken 
and the egg conundrum.  First, the architecture of the network must have some definition.  
Those who are developing a network and the users of the network must collaborate to solve 
this problem.  Clearly, a network analysis to identify who is involved and how they are 
collaborating would be more beneficial than mandating a change and hoping that those 
actors in the network would comply. 
Summary 
Networks describe both formal and informal ways of getting things done in the 
acquisition system.  The marketplace rarely delivers what the DoD needs at the quantity that 
it is needed.  Some commodities may be purchased in the marketplace, but the 
uncertainties associated with DoD needs do not allow firms to match their supply to 
demand.  Also, many of the DoD's needs are based on interoperability between programs 
that must be defined before the market can react to this need.  The largest transactions, 
which involve the lion's share of the modernization budget, rely on the interactions between 
JCIDS, PPBE, and the acquisition system.  A hierarchy exists to account for the resources 
input into the process.  However, the complexities and dynamic nature of the process can 
best be described as a network of actors who use their relationships to affect outcomes. 
Would Glenn Curtiss recognize this network that delivers today's innovative stealth 
aircraft, advanced combat systems, and ships?  He probably would.  If you brought Mr. 
Curtiss into a meeting with a program manager, MAJCOM requirements officer, and a 
contractor, he would feel right at home.  Mr. Curtiss was no stranger to hierarchies given the 
size of the Curtiss Aircraft Company.  Nonetheless, he knew that innovation occurs when a 















                  Acquisition Research: CREATING SYNERGY FOR INFORMED CHANGE      - 229 - 
 
Appendix A. DOD 5000 process Model 
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Appendix B. Acquisition Networks 
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D.  Persistent Relationships from Concept Refinement Through 





























Requirements 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
(3) Program 




(MDA) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(5) Contractor 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
(6) MAJCOM 
Budget 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
(7) SAF/AQX 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
(8) Service Acq 
Exec 
(SAF/AQ) 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
(9) SAF/FM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
(10) AF/XP 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
(11) Center 
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